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Abstract 
A lack of political legitimacy undermines the ability of the European Union (EU) to resolve major crises and threatens 
the stability of the system as a whole. By integrating digital data into political processes, the EU seeks to base decision-
making increasingly on sound empirical evidence. In particular, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have the potential 
to increase political legitimacy by identifying pressing societal issues, forecasting potential policy outcomes, informing 
the policy process, and evaluating policy effectiveness. This paper investigates how citizens’ perceptions of EU input, 
throughput, and output legitimacy are influenced by three distinct decision-making arrangements: (1) independent 
human decision-making (HDM); (2) independent algorithmic decision-making (ADM) by AI-based systems; and (3) 
hybrid decision-making by EU politicians and AI-based systems together. The results of a pre-registered online 
experiment (n = 572) suggest that existing EU decision-making arrangements are still perceived as the most democratic 
(input legitimacy). However, regarding the decision-making process itself (throughput legitimacy) and its policy 
outcomes (output legitimacy), no difference was observed between the status quo and hybrid decision-making 
involving both ADM and democratically elected EU institutions. Where ADM systems are the sole decision-maker, 
respondents tend to perceive these as illegitimate. The paper discusses the implications of these findings for (a) EU 
legitimacy and (b) data-driven policy-making. 
 
Policy Significance 
The results of this experimental study suggest that respondents perceive demanding forms of algorithmic decision-
making (ADM) to be illegitimate for EU policy-making. EU policy-makers should exercise caution when incorporating 
ADM systems in the political decision-making process. ADM systems for far reaching decisions such as budgeting 
should only be used to assist or consult human decision-makers rather than replacing them. An additional takeaway 
from this study is that the factual and perceived legitimacy of ADM do not necessarily correspond—that is, even ADM 
systems that produce high quality outputs and are implemented transparently and fairly may still be perceived as 
illegitimate and might therefore be rejected by the electorate. To be socially acceptable, implementation of ADM 
systems must therefore take account of both factual and perceived legitimacy.  
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) currently faces a number of significant crises, most notably the European debt crisis, 
the distribution of refugees across EU member states, and the so-called “Brexit” (withdrawal of the United King-
dom from the EU). As a result, right-wing populist parties promoting anti-EU messages have gained momentum 
and threaten the stability of the EU as a whole (Schmidt, 2015). To resolve these crises, the EU must demonstrate 
responsiveness to citizens’ concerns (input legitimacy), effective and transparent procedures (throughput legiti-
macy) and good governance performance (output legitimacy) (Schmidt, 2013; Weiler, 2012). However, the EU 
allegedly lacks legitimacy on all three counts because of a democratic deficit in the institution’s design, the lack 
of a European identity, and the inadequacies of the European public sphere (Follesdal, 2006; Habermas, 2009; 
Risse, 2014).  
To improve their legitimacy, EU political institutions have increasingly committed to data-driven forms of gov-
ernance. By integrating digital data into political processes, the EU seeks increasingly to base decision-making 
on sound empirical evidence (e.g., the Data4Policy Project). In particular, algorithmic decision-making (ADM) 
systems are used to identify pressing societal issues, to forecast potential policy outcomes, to inform the policy 
process, and to evaluate policy effectiveness (AlgorithmWatch, 2019; Poel, Meyer, & Schroeder, 2018). For in-
stance, ADM systems have been shown to successfully support decision-making regarding the socially acceptable 
distribution of refugees. Trials suggest that this approach increases refugee employment rates by 40–70% as com-
pared to human-led distribution practices (Bansak et al., 2018).  
However, little is known about the specific impact of ADM on public perceptions of legitimacy (De Fine Licht & 
De Fine Licht, 2020). On the one hand, high public support for digitalization in general and autonomous systems 
in particular means that the use of ADM may increase perceived legitimacy (European Commission, 2017). No-
tably, ADM systems are commonly perceived as true, objective, and accurate and therefore capable of reducing 
human bias in the decision-making process (Barocas & Selbst, 2016; Lee, 2018). On the other hand, ADM-based 
policy-making poses a number of novel challenges in terms of perceived legitimacy. (1) Citizens may believe that 
they have little influence on ADM selection criteria—for instance, which digital data are collected, or on which 
indicators the algorithm ultimately bases decisions (input legitimacy). (2) Citizens may not understand the com-
plex and often opaque technicalities of the ADM process (throughput legitimacy). (3) Citizens may doubt that 
ADM systems can make better decisions than humans, or they may question whether certain decisions produce 
the desired results (output legitimacy).  
Few studies have investigated the effects of ADM on perceptions of legitimacy, especially with respect to political 
decisions. To date, empirical studies have tended to focus on public sector areas such as education and health, 
evaluating the effects of ADM as compared to human decision-making (HDM) in terms of variables such as 
fairness and trust (Araujo, Helberger, Kruikemeier, & de Vreese, 2020; Lee, 2018; Marcinkowski, Kieslich, 
Starke, & Lünich, 2020). To bridge this research gap, the present study investigates the extent to which the use of 
ADM influences the perceived legitimacy of policy-making at EU level. In so doing, the study extends the existing 
literature in three respects. (1) It provides novel insights into the potential of ADM to exacerbate or alleviate the 
EU’s perceived legitimacy deficit. (2) It clarifies the effects of three distinct decision-making arrangements on 
perceptions of legitimacy: (a) independent decision making by EU politicians or “human decision-making” 
(HDM); (b) independent decision making by ADM systems or “algorithmic decision-making” (ADM); and (c) 
hybrid decision-making, where politicians select among decisions suggested by ADM systems. (3) Using struc-
tural means modeling (SMM) to analyze citizens’ perceptions, the study proposes a general measure of input, 
throughput, and output legitimacy.  
 
2. A Crisis of EU Legitimacy? Input, Throughput, Output 
In making effective decisions to resolve major crises, the EU’s actions depend on political legitimacy. According 
to Gurr, “governance can be considered legitimate in so far as its subjects regard it as proper and deserving of 
support” (1971, p. 185). In his seminal work on legitimacy, Scharpf (1999) distinguished between two dimensions 
of legitimacy; input legitimacy, which Schmidt characterized as “responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of 
participation by the people” (2013, p. 2). Input legitimacy depends on free and fair elections, high voter turnout, 
and lively political debate in the public sphere (Scharpf, 1999). Output legitimacy refers to “the effectiveness of 
the EU’s policy outcomes for the people” (Schmidt, 2013, p. 2)—that is, the EU’s problem-solving capacity in 
pursuing desired goals such as preserving peace, ensuring security, protecting the environment, and fostering 
prosperity (Follesdal, 2006). Moving beyond this dichotomy, some scholars (Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt & Wood, 
2019) have added throughput as a third dimension of legitimacy, referring to the accountability, efficacy, and 
transparency of EU policy-makers and their “inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people” 
(Schmidt, 2013, p. 2). Also referred to as the “black box” (Steffek, 2018, p. 1), throughput legitimacy encompasses 
the political practices and processes of EU institutions in turning citizen input into policy output (Schmidt & 
Wood, 2019; Steffek, 2018).  
Ever since the EU was founded, and especially since the failed Constitutional Treaty referenda in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005, European integration has been dogged by criticisms that the EU lacks legitimacy. Most 
scholars point to the democratic deficit, the lack of a European identity, and an inadequate public sphere as primary 
reasons for this alleged crisis of legitimacy (Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Habermas, 2009). The debate centers on four 
arguments (De Angelis, 2017; Follesdal, 2006; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Holzhacker, 2007). First, among key EU 
political institutions, only the European Parliament (EP) is legitimized by European citizens by means of elections, 
but scholars argue that the EP is too weak in comparison to the European Commission (EC) (Follesdal & Hix, 
2006). While continuous reform of EU treaties has substantially strengthened the EP’s role within the institutional 
design of the EU, it still lacks the power to initiate legislation (Holzhacker, 2007). Second, the EU’s institutional 
design gives national governments pivotal power over the Council of the EU and the EC. However, as those actors 
are somewhat exempt from parliamentary scrutiny by the EP and national parliaments, there is a deficit in demo-
cratic checks and balances (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Third, the European elections are not sufficiently “European” 
(Follesdal, 2006)—that is, “they are not about the personalities and parties at the European level or the direction 
of the EU policy agenda” (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 536). Instead, national politicians, parties, and issues still 
dominate campaigns and remain crucial in citizens’ voting decisions (Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011). Finally, “the EU 
is simply ‘too distant’ from voters” (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 536). Public opinion research suggests that although 
a sense of European identity, trust in European institutions, and satisfaction with EU democracy are on the rise, 
these pale in comparison to the corresponding scores at national level (European Commission, 2019b; Risse, 
2014). Consequently, scholars have argued that the EU lacks a European demos—that is, “a strong sense of com-
munity and loyalty among a political group” (Risse, 2014, p. 1207). In addition, the alleged lack of a European 
public sphere that would enable communication and debate around political issues lends further credence to the 
claim that the EU suffers from insufficient citizen participation (Habermas, 2009; Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2012).  
As all four arguments primarily question the EU’s input and throughput legitimacy, many have argued that output 
is the stronghold for the EU legitimacy. According to Scharpf, “the EU has developed considerable effectiveness 
as a regulatory authority” (2009, p. 177). In that regard, the EU enables member states to implement policies that 
they would otherwise be unable to advance, especially in relation to global policy issues (Menon & Weatherill, 
2008). Weiler contended that output legitimacy “is part of the very ethos of the Commission” (2012, p. 828), but 
recent crises have also challenged this view; for instance, the austerity measures imposed on debtor states had 
detrimental effects on the lives of many European citizens (De Angelis, 2017). Debate about the EU’s alleged 
legitimacy crisis centers primarily on institutional shortcomings in the political system, and public perceptions of 
legitimacy are neglected. However, Jones (2009) claimed that subjective perceptions are often more important 
than the normative criteria themselves.  
 
3. ADM for policy-making in the EU? 
In recent years, EU institutions have increasingly sought to address this perceived deficit of legitimacy through 
evidence-based policy-making: “Against the backdrop of multiple crises, policymakers seem ever more inclined 
to legitimize specific ways of action by referring to ‘hard’ scientific evidence suggesting that a particular initiative 
will eventually yield the desired outcomes” (Rieder & Simon, 2016, p. 1). This push for numerical evidence comes 
at a time when the computerization of society has precipitated the creation and storage of vast amounts of digital 
data. According to boyd and Crawford, so-called big data “offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that 
can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy” (2012, p. 
663). The value assigned to big data as an information asset reflects the insights gained from characteristics such 
as volume, variety, velocity, and presumed veracity (De Mauro, Greco, & Grimaldi, 2016). Digital data are col-
lected, accessed, and analyzed in real time, leading to substantial advances in analytics, modeling, and dynamic 
visualization (Craglia et al., 2018; Poel et al., 2018). This transformation of real-world phenomena into digital 
data is expected to provide a timely and undistorted view of societal mechanisms and institutions.  
Lately, public discourse around the potential of computerization and big data has included a renewed focus on 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). According to Katz,  
“AI stands for a confused mix of terms—such as ‘big data,’ ‘machine learning,’ or ‘deep 
learning’—whose common denominator is the use of expensive computing power to an-
alyze massive centralized data. (…) It’s a vision in which truth emerges from big data, 
where more metrics always need to be imposed upon human endeavors, and where inex-
orable progress in technology can ‘solve’ humanity’s problems” (2017, p. 2).  
Indeed, the increasing availability of digital data in combination with significant advances in computing power 
have underpinned the recent emergence of many successful AI applications such as self-driving cars and auto-
mated text production and face recognition. This has in turn raised expectations regarding the use of AI for evi-
dence-based or data-driven policy-making (Esty & Rushing, 2007; Giest, 2017; Poel et al., 2018). To exploit 
technological developments and increasing data availability for policy-making purposes, the EC introduced the 
Data4Policy initiative (European Commission, 2019a), arguing that “data technologies are amongst the valuable 
tools that policymakers have at hand for informing the policy process, from identifying issues, to designing their 
intervention and monitoring results” (European Commission, 2019a, para. 1). 
In that context, van Veenstra and Kotterink (2017, p. 101) noted that “data-driven policy making is not only 
expected to result in better policies, but also aims to create legitimacy.” Recent reports suggest that “algorithmi-
cally driven, automated decision-making (ADM) systems are already in use all over the EU” (AlgorithmWatch, 
2019, p. 10) to deliver public services, optimize traffic flows, or identify social fraud (AlgorithmWatch, 2019; 
Poel et al., 2018). Case studies confirm that ADM systems can indeed contribute to better policy (Bansak et al., 
2018), using big data to identify emerging issues, to foresee demand for political action, to monitor social prob-
lems, and to design policy options (Poel et al., 2018; Verhulst, Engin, & Crowcroft, 2019). To that extent, data-
driven systems can potentially contribute to the increased legitimacy of input (by enabling new forms of citizen 
participation,) of throughput (by making the political process more transparent), and of output (by increasing the 
quality of policies and outcomes).  
Yet, despite these promising indications, there are numerous examples of AI’s downside in political decision-
making. For instance, a recent report by the research institute AI NOW revealed that ADM systems may falsely 
accuse citizens of fraud, arbitrarily exclude them from food support programs, or mistakenly reduce their disability 
benefits. Incorrect classification by ADM systems has led to a wave of lawsuits against the US government at 
federal and state levels, undermining both the much vaunted cost efficiency of automated systems and the per-
ceived legitimacy of political decision-making as a whole (Richardson, Schultz, & Southerland, 2019). In terms 
of the three dimensions of legitimacy, ADM systems pose the following challenges. (1) On the input dimension, 
citizens may lack insight into or influence over the criteria or data that intelligent algorithms use to make decisions. 
(2) On the throughput dimension, citizens may be unable to comprehend the complex and often inscrutable logic 
that underpins algorithmic predictions, recommendations, or decisions. (3) On the output dimension, citizens may 
fundamentally doubt whether ADM systems actually contribute to more efficient policy. 
As with all technological innovations, success or failure depends greatly on all stakeholders’ participation and 
acceptance (Bauer, 1995). In the present context, those stakeholders include EU institutions and bureaucracies, 
operatives and regulators who may favor the introduction of ADM systems in policy-making, and the electoral 
body of voters and citizens who lend legitimacy to proposed policies and implementation. The present study 
focuses on perceptions of European citizens regarding the legitimacy of using ADM systems in EU governance 
and political decision-making. 
While there are no existing accounts of citizens’ perceptions of ADM systems in the context of political decision-
making, survey data provide some initial insights. Several Eurobarometer surveys have shown that public percep-
tion of digital technologies is broadly positive throughout the EU, especially when compared to perceptions of 
other mega-technologies such as nuclear power, biotechnology, or gene editing (European Commission, 2015, 
2017). According to a recent survey commissioned by the Center for the Governance of Change, “25% of Euro-
peans are somewhat or totally in favor of letting an artificial intelligence make important decisions about the 
running of their country“ (Rubio & Lastra, 2019, p. 10). On that basis, it seems likely that demands to embed AI 
in the political process will increase, and that political programs will respond to those demands. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
The key objective of this study was to investigate whether and to what extent ADM systems in policy-making 
influence public perceptions of EU input, throughput, and output legitimacy. More specifically, we examined the 
decision-making process that determines how the EU’s annual budget is distributed. Previous empirical studies 
have suggested that different decision-making arrangements (e.g., formal vs. descriptive representation, direct 
voting vs. deliberation) can differ significantly in terms of their perceived legitimacy (Arnesen, Broderstad, 
Johannesson, & Linde, 2019; Arnesen & Peters, 2018; Esaiasson, Gilljam, & Persson, 2012; Persson, Esaiasson, 
& Gilljam, 2013). However, as those studies did not specifically investigate the potential effects of ADM systems, 
the present study sought to distinguish between three different decision-making arrangements: (1) independent 
decision-making by EU politicians (human decision-making); (2) independent decision-making by ADM systems 
(algorithmic decision-making); and (3) hybrid decision-making by politicians, based on suggestions made by 
ADM systems.  
With regard to perceived input legitimacy, we contend that respondents are likely to perceive the current decision-
making process as more legitimate than processes that rely partly or completely on ADM. The primary reason for 
this assumption is that ADM would arguably render citizen participation in EU governance largely obsolete or at 
least diminished. First attempts suggest that data science could be used to asses public leaning towards policy 
issues via text mining of Social Media data (Sluban & Battiston, 2017). Yet, using technological solutions to make 
policy decisions based on such automated monitoring of public opinion is unlikely to increase public perceptions 
of input legitimacy, especially not at the expense of existing democratic procedures. Thus, even though current 
policy-making procedures in the EU are often critiziced for their democratic deficit, for the foreseeable future 
algorithmic or hybrid decision systems would likely marginalize citizen participation, especially if they are used 
for decision-making rather than less demanding forms of the policy cycle such as agenda setting or evaluation 
(Verhulst et al., 2019). To that extent, the introduction of ADM would weaken the perceived democratic quality 
of political action in the EU. On that basis, we tested the following pre-registered hypotheses (see pre-registration 
at OSF): 
H1a: Human decision-making leads to higher perceived input legitimacy as compared to algorithmic decision-
making.  
H1b: Human decision-making leads to higher perceived input legitimacy as compared to hybrid decision-making.  
H1c: Hybrid decision-making leads to higher perceived input legitimacy as compared to algorithmic decision-
making. 
With regard to perceived throughput legitimacy, we argue that implementation of ADM leads to lower levels of 
perceived legitimacy as compared to the existing political process. While EU decision-making processes are often 
criticized for their lack of transparency, ADM systems suffer from the same deficiency, as they are themselves 
considered to be a “black box” (Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Russell, 2018). The extent of transparency of self-learning 
systems, however, is a major driver of public perceptions of legitimacy ((De Fine Licht & De Fine Licht, 2020). 
A recent EC report therefore stressed the urgent need to make ADM more explainable and transparent (Craglia et 
al., 2018), on the grounds that such systems are typically too complex for the layperson to understand and are 
largely unable to give proper justifications for decisions. They further lack public accountability because citizens 
do not know who to turn to regarding policy or administrative failures. Indeed, preliminary empirical evidence 
suggests that activities that require human skills are perceived as fairer and more trustworthy when executed by 
humans rather than algorithms (Lee, 2018). On that basis, we formulated the following hypotheses. 
H2a: Human decision-making leads to higher perceived throughput legitimacy as compared to algorithmic deci-
sion-making.  
H2b: Human decision-making leads to higher perceived throughput legitimacy as compared to hybrid decision-
making.  
H2c: Hybrid decision-making leads to higher perceived throughput legitimacy as compared to algorithmic deci-
sion-making. 
Several scholars suggest that the EU already legitimizes itself primarily via the output dimension (Scharpf, 2009; 
Weiler, 2012) due to the aforementioned democratic decifit on the input dimension. Below, we argue why imple-
menting algorithmic or hybrid decision system would mean that the EU is doubling down on ouput legitimacy. 
Perceived output legitimacy comprises two key dimensions: citizens’ perceptions of whether political decisions 
can attain predefined goals (e.g., economic growth, environmental sustainability), and the subjective favorability 
of such decisions. Assessment of the perceived quality of political output involves both dimensions, and this is 
where ADM systems are said to have a distinct advantage over human decision-makers, as they can produce novel 
insights from vast amounts of digital data that would be impossible when relying solely on human intelligence 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012). Empirical studies comparing public perceptions of ADM and HDM seem to support 
this assumption; looking at proxies for legitimacy, ADM systems are evaluated as fairer in distributive terms than 
HDM (Marcinkowski et al., 2020), especially in high impact situations (Araujo et al., 2020). Building on these 
empirical findings, we further argue that citizens perceive ADM systems to be most legitimate when they operate 
under the scrutiny of democratically elected institutions. Thus, we formulated the following hypotheses. 
H3a: Human decision-making leads to lower perceived goal attainment as compared to algorithmic decision-
making. 
H3b: Human decision-making leads to lower perceived goal attainment as compared to hybrid decision-making. 
H3c: Hybrid decision-making leads to higher perceived goal attainment as compared to algorithmic decision-
making. 
H4a: Human decision-making leads to lower decision favorability as compared to algorithmic decision-making. 
H4b: Human decision-making leads to lower decision favorability as compared to hybrid decision-making. 
H4c: Hybrid decision-making leads to higher decision favorability as compared to algorithmic decision-making. 
 
5. Method 
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment, applying a between-subjects-design using one factor 
with three levels: (1) EU politicians making decisions independently (condHDM); (2) ADM systems making deci-
sions independently (condADM); and (3) ADM systems suggesting decisions to be passed by EU politicians 
(condHybrid) (see pre-registration1 at OSF). All measurements and stimulus material and the questionnaire’s basic 
functionality were thoroughly tested in multiple pre-tests involving 321 respondents in total. 
5.1. Sample 
Respondents were recruited through the non-commercial SoSci Open Access Panel (OAP) during the period 8–
22 April 2019. In accordance with German law, SoSci OAP registration involves a double opt-in process, in which 
panelists first sign up using an email address and must then activate their account and confirm pool membership 
(Leiner, 2016). Although the SoSci OAP is not representative in terms of socio-demographic variables, its key 
advantage is participant motivation; as respondents are not compensated for survey participation, their main mo-
tivation is topic interest, which is a crucial indicator of data quality (Brüggen, Wetzels, De Ruyter, & Schillewaert, 
2011). In addition, all questionnaires using the SoSci OAP must first undergo rigorous peer review, so ensuring 
“major improvements to the instrument before data is collected” (Leiner, 2016, p. 373).  
Using Soper’s (2019) a priori sample size calculator for structural equation modeling, we determined an optimal 
sample size of 520, based on the results from a pre-test conducted 10 weeks before final data collection. In total, 
612 respondents completed the questionnaire. A thorough two-step cleaning process was applied for quality con-
trol purposes. The first step excluded respondents who failed an attention check regarding the target topic (n = 
14). In the second step, using the DEG_Time variable (Leiner, 2013), each respondent accumulated minus points 
                                                            
1 Table 4 in the Appendix accounts for all deviations from pre-registration.  
for completing single questions or the whole questionnaire too quickly. As the SoSci OAP administrators recom-
mend a threshold score of 50 for rigorous filtering, all respondents with a minus point score of 50 or higher were 
excluded from the analysis (n = 26). After filtering, the sample comprised 572 respondents—a response rate of 
19.1%. No differences were observed between the conditions in terms of age (M = 47.26, SD = 15.99; F(2, 569) 
= .182, p = .834); gender (female = 45.8 %, male = 53.5 %, diverse = .7 %; Χ2(4) = 1.89, p = .757); and education 
(non-tertiary education = 40.6 %, tertiary education = 59.4 %; Χ2(2) = .844, p = .656). 
5.2. Treatment conditions (independent variable) 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions and received a short text (ca. 250 words per 
condition) about the decision-making process regarding distribution of the annual EU budget. The stimulus ma-
terial also included a pie chart showing budget allocation for different policy areas. The text was adapted from the 
official EU website (European Union, 2019). While the pie chart was identical for all three conditions, the closing 
paragraph of the text was edited to reflect manipulation of the independent variable: (a) decisions made by politi-
cians of EU institutions only—the status quo (condHDM; n = 182); (b) decisions made by ADM only (condADM; n 
= 204); and (c) decisions suggested by ADM and subsequently passed by politicians of EU institutions (condHybrid; 
n = 186)2. Respondents were not deceived into thinking that condADM and condHybrid are existing decision-making 
procedures in the EU as it was explicitly stressed that the scenario at hand was only a potential decision-making 
process. At the end of the survey, they were debriefed about the research interest of the study 
5.3. Manipulation Check 
All respondents answered two items that served as manipulation checks to validate that respondents perceived the 
differences in the respective conditions. First, perceived technical automation of the decision-making process was 
assessed by responses (on a 5-point Likert scale) to the question How technically automated was the decision-
making process? The results indicated a significant difference among the three conditions (F(2, 524) = 389.71 p 
< .001). Using a Games-Howell post hoc test, condHDM (M = 2.11; SD = .97), condADM (M = 4.52; SD = .77), and 
condHybrid (M = 4.16; SD = .80) were found to differ significantly from each other, confirming that respondents 
recognized the extent to which the described decision-making processes were technically automated. 
The perceived involvement of political actors and institutions in the different decision-making arrangements was 
measured by responses (on a 5-point Likert scale) to the question What role did politicians or political institutions 
play in the decision-making process? Again, there were significant differences among the three conditions (F(2, 
548) = 161.98, p < .001). Using a Games-Howell post hoc test, condHDM (M = 4.45; SD = .88), condADM (M = 
2.63; SD = .99), and condHybrid (M = 3.41; SD = 1.04), all were found to differ significantly from each other, 
confirming that respondents recognized the degree to which political actors and institutions were involved in each 
condition. 
5.4. Measures 
As Persson et al. (2013, p. 391) rightly noted, “legitimacy is an inherently abstract concept that is hard to measure 
directly.” To account for this difficulty, measures for input legitimacy (dV1), throughput legitimacy (dV2) and 
output legitimacy using the two dependent variables goal attainment (dV3) and decision favorability (dV4) were 
thoroughly pre-tested and validated. All items used in the analysis were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, rang-
ing from 1 (do not agree) to 5 (agree) and including the residual category don’t know. The factor validity of all 
measures was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α) and average variance extracted (AVE). Means (M), standard 
deviations (SD), α scores, and AVE of all measures are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 A translation of the stimulus material can be found in the Appendix. 
Table 1. 
Descriptives and Factorial Validity 
 M SD 
Input Legitimacy 1.66 0.85 
Throughput Legitimacy 2.76 1.00 
Goal Attainment 3.28 0.91 
Decision Acceptance 2.96 1.05 
Note. AVE = Average Variance Extracted 
 
Input Legitimacy (dV1). Three items were used to measure perceived input legitimacy, using wording adapted3 
from previous studies (Colquitt & Rodell, 2015; Lindgren & Persson, 2010; Persson et al., 2013): (1) All citizens 
had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process (IL1); (2) People like me could voice their 
opinions in the decision-making process (IL2); and (3) People like me could influence the decision-making pro-
cess (IL3). All items were randomized and used as indicators of a latent variable in the analysis.  
Throughput Legitimacy (dV2). To measure perceived throughput legitimacy, three items were adapted from Wer-
ner and Marien (2018). Respondents were asked indicate to what extent they perceived the decision-making pro-
cess described in the stimulus material as (1) fair (TL1); (2) satisfactory (TL2); and (3) appropriate (TL3). All 
items were randomized and used as indicators of a latent variable in the analysis.  
Goal Attainment (dV3). To measure perceived goal attainment, which is considered an important pillar of output 
legitimacy (Lindgren & Persson, 2010), respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they believed the de-
cision-making process could achieve the goals referred to in the stimulus text (adapted from the official EU web-
site): (1) Better development of transport routes, energy networks and communication links between EU countries 
(GA1);. (2) Improved protection of the environment throughout Europe (GA2); (3) An increase in the global 
competitiveness of the European economy (GA3); and (4) Promoting cross-border associations of European sci-
entists and researchers (GA4) (European Union, 2019). The order of the items was randomized. As the four goals 
can be independently attained, the underlying construct is not one-dimensional and reflective. For that reason, we 
computed a mean index for goal attainment that was used as a manifest variable in the analysis.  
Decision Favorability (dV4). In the existing literature, decision acceptance or favorability is commonly used as a 
measure of legitimacy (Esaiasson et al., 2012; Werner & Marien, 2018). Conceptualizing decision favorability as 
the second key pillar of output legitimacy, we used three items to measure dV4. Two of these items were adopted 
from Werner and Marien’s (2018) four-item scale: (1) I accept the decision (DF1), and (2) I agree with the deci-
sion (DF2). As the other two items in their scale refer to the concept of reactance, we opted to formulate one 
additional item: (3) The decision satisfies me (DF3). All items were randomized and used as indicators of a latent 
variable in the analysis.  
5.5. Data Analysis 
The analysis employed structured means modeling (SMM), incorporating all four variables in a single model. As 
this approach takes account of measurement error due to latent variables, it was adopted in preference to traditional 
analysis of variance (Breitsohl, 2018). To test the hypotheses, we compared means between groups, using critical 
ratios for differences between parameters in the specified model. All statistical analyses were performed using 
AMOS 23. Because of missing data, Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation was used in conjunction 
with estimation of means and intercepts (Kline, 2016). Full model fit was assessed using a chi-square test and 
RMSEA (lower and upper bound of the 90% confidence interval, PClose value), along with the Tucker-Lewis-
Index (TLI) measure of goodness of fit (Holbert & Stephenson, 2002; van de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012). 
Differences in means were investigated by obtaining critical ratios (CR); for CR > 1.96 or < -1.96, respectively, 
the parameter difference indicated two-sided statistical significance at the 5% level. 
                                                            
3 All items were translated from English into German. 
As the experimental design compared three groups, we tested the measurement models of all latent factors for 
measurement invariance (Kline, 2016; van de Schoot et al., 2012). This test was necessary to assess whether factor 
loadings (metric invariance) and item intercepts (scalar invariance) were equal across groups. This “strong invar-
iance” is a necessary precondition to confirm that latent factors are measuring the same construct and can be 
meaningfully compared across groups (Widaman & Reise, 1997). The chi-square-difference test for strong meas-
urement invariance in Table 2 shows that the assumptions of metric and scalar invariance are violated. Subsequent 
testing of indicator items identified indicator IL02 as non-invariant. On that basis, a model with only partial in-
variance was estimated, freeing both the indicator loading and item intercept constraints of IL01. A chi-square-
difference test for partial measurement invariance showed better model fit as compared to the configural model 
(ΔΧ2 = 18.034, Δdf = 16; p = .322). The final model with partial measurement invariance fit the data well (Χ2(106) 
= 173.299, p < .001; RMSEA = .033 (.024; .042); PClose = .999; TLI = .966). The latent means of the specified 
model with partial invariance were constrained to zero in condHDM. On that basis, the first condition, in which 
only EU politicians made decisions about the EU budget, was used as the reference group when reporting the 
results of group comparisons. 
Table 2.  
Descriptives and Factorial Validity 
 Χ2 df p TLI RMSEA PClose 
Configural Model 155.265 90 < .001 .961 .036 (.026; .045) .995 
Metric Invariance 198.964 102 < .001 .949 .041 (.032; .049) .963 
Scalar Invariance 219.483 114 < .001 .950 .040 (.032; .048) .978 
Final Model with Partial Invariance 173.299 106 < .001 .966 .033 (.024; .042) .999 
 
6. Results 
Construct means are shown in Table 3. In addition, based on a transformation of Hedge’s g, a standardized effect 
size r as proposed by Steimetz et al. (2009) was manually calculated. This is also reported in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
Comparisons of Structured Means of the Legitimacy Dimensions 
 Means Effect Sizes (r) 
 condHDM condADM condHybrid condHDM 
vs. 
condADM 
condADM 
vs. 
condHybrid 
condHDM 
vs. 
condHybrid 
Input Legitimacy 0 -.494 -.262 .25 .13 .13 
Throughput  
Legitimacy 
0a -.346 .070a .15 .19 .00 
Goal Attainment 3.37a 3.15b 3.29a,b, .11 .00 .00 
Decision Acceptance 0a -.347 .025a .15 .15 .00 
Note. Means not sharing any letter are significantly different by the test of critical ratios at the 5% level of signif-
icance. 
With regard to perceived input legitimacy, we assumed that this would be highest in condHDM (in which only EU 
politicians made budget decisions) and lowest in condADM (decisions based solely on ADM), with condHybrid (ADM 
and EU politicians combined) somewhere between the two. The results indicate that respondents perceived input 
legitimacy as significantly lower in condADM (ΔM = -.494, p < .001) and condHybrid (ΔM = -.262, p = .011). As the 
difference between these conditions was also significant (ΔM = -.232, p = .009), hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c 
were supported. 
For perceived throughput legitimacy, the results indicate (as expected) that condADM was perceived as significantly 
less legitimate than condHDM (ΔM = -.346, p < .001). No difference was observed between condHDM and condHybrid 
(ΔM = -.070, p = .481), but condHybrid differed significantly from condADM (ΔM = -.276, p = .004). As a conse-
quence, hypotheses H2a and H2b were supported while H2c was rejected. 
In contrast to input and throughput legitimacy, we assumed that condHDM would score lower than the other two 
conditions for perceived goal attainment, and that condHybrid would score higher than the other two conditions. In 
fact, condHDM returned the highest mean (M = 3.37) and did not differ significantly from condHybrid (M = 3.29; ΔM 
= .083, p = .383). Again, condADM scored lowest (M = 3.15) and differed significantly from condHDM (ΔM = .223, 
p = .014) but not from condHybrid (ΔM = -.014, p = .151). These results found no support for hypotheses H3a, H3b, 
or H3c and even ran counter to the assumptions of H3a. 
We anticipated that perceived decision favorability would be highest for condHybrid, lowest for condHDM, with con-
dADM somewhere between the two. In fact, condADM scored significantly lower than condHDM (ΔM = -.347, p < 
.001) and significantly lower than condHybrid (ΔM = -.372, p < .001). There was no significant difference between 
condHDM and condHybrid (ΔM = -.25, p = .809). As a result, H4a and H4b were rejected while H4c was accepted. 
 
7. Discussion 
This paper answers the call for more empirical research to understand the nexus of ADM for political decision-
making and its perceived legitimacy (De Fine Licht & De Fine Licht, 2020). How does the integration of AI into 
political decision-making influence people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of the decision-making process? In 
pursuit of preliminary answers to this question, the results of a pre-registered online experiment that systematically 
manipulated levels of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) in EU policy-making yielded three main insights. 
First, existing EU decision-making arrangements were considered the most democratic—that is, they scored high-
est on input legitimacy. Second, in terms of process quality (throughput legitimacy) and outcome quality (output 
legitimacy), no differences were observed between existing decision-making arrangements and hybrid decision-
making. Finally, decision-making informed solely by ADM was perceived as the least legitimate arrangement 
across all three dimensions. In the following sections, we consider the implications of these findings for EU legit-
imacy, data-driven policy-making, and avenues for future research.  
7.1. Implications for the legitimacy of the EU 
Our findings lend further credence to previous assertions that the EU lacks political legitimacy (Holzhacker, 
2007), in that current decision-making arrangements, which solely involve EU politicians, score low on input 
legitimacy (M = 1.90 on a 5-point Likert scale). This finding speaks to a previously noted democratic deficit 
(Follesdal, 2006; Follesdal & Hix, 2006). The present results further reveal that ADM systems do not seem to 
offer an appropriate remedy; on the contrary, it seems that such systems may even exacerbate the problem, as the 
existing process is still perceived as having greater input legitimacy than arrangements based wholly or partly on 
ADM systems. It appears that ADM systems fail to engage citizens in the decision-making process or to make 
their voices heard. Implementing ADM technologies to assist or replace human political actors is seen as less 
democratic than the status quo, even though incumbent decision-makers such as the European Commission them-
selves lack democratic legitimacy. One plausible explanation for this finding is that ADM systems are even more 
technocratic and detached from voters than EU politicians. For that reason, citizens favor human decision makers 
when dealing with human tasks, aligning with earlier findings by Lee (2018).  
As the EU depends heavily on public approval, it seems important to explore alternative ways of increasing its 
legitimacy. Rather than leaving political decisions to ADM systems, less demanding forms of data-driven policy-
making might help to achieve this goal. Beyond decision making, data-driven applications can help to address 
input legitimacy deficits by contributing to a much wider range of tasks that include foresight, agenda setting, and 
evaluation (AlgorithmWatch, 2019; Poel et al., 2018). For instance, some existing applications already use public 
discourse and opinion poll data to predict issues that require political action before these become problematic. 
Further empirical investigation is needed to assess how such applications might affect legitimacy perceptions. In 
relation to ADM, our findings highlight citizens’ skepticism regarding the potential of digital technologies to 
increase input legitimacy in terms of democratic participation, and the EU must assess the use of ADM in this 
light.  
With regard to the quality of decision-making processes—that is, throughput legitimacy—we found no difference 
between existing decision-making arrangements and hybrid regimes involving ADM systems and EU politicians. 
However, citizens seem to view decision making based solely on ADM systems as less fair or appropriate than 
the other two arrangements. Regarding existing EU procedures and practices, critics lament a lack of transparency, 
efficiency, and accountability (Schmidt & Wood, 2019), but ADM systems exhibit the same deficiency (Shin & 
Park, 2019). Inside the “black box”, ADM systems change and adapt decision-making criteria according to new 
inputs and elusive feedback loops that defy explanation even among AI experts. Under the umbrella term “ex-
plainable AI,” a significant strand of the computer science literature seeks to enhance ADM’s transparency to 
users and the general public (Miller, 2019; Mittelstadt, Russell, & Wachter, 2019). For instance, “counterfactual 
explanations” indicate which ADM criteria would need to be changed to arrive at a different decision (Wachter et 
al., 2018).  
Regarding citizens’ perceptions of the effectiveness and favorability of decision-making outcomes (output legiti-
macy), we found no difference between the existing decision-making process and hybrid regimes incorporating 
ADM systems and EU politicians. ADM-based systems alone are considered unable to achieve desired goals, and 
citizens would not approve of the corresponding decisions. It is important to note that decision output was identical 
for all three experimental conditions, and that only the decision-making process varied. Nevertheless, these result 
in differing perceptions of output legitimacy, implying that factual legitimacy (as in the actual quality of policies 
and their outcomes) and perceived legitimacy are not necessarily congruent. In relation to the European debt crisis, 
Jones (2009) suggested that political institutions must convince the public that they are performing properly, 
whatever their actual performance. As the interplay between actual and perceived performance also seems im-
portant in the case of ADM, we contend that both aspects warrant equal consideration when implementing such 
systems in policy-making.  
Some of the present results run counter to our hypotheses. Given the largely positive attitude to AI in the EU 
(European Commission, 2015, 2017), and in light of recent empirical evidence (Araujo et al., 2020; Marcinkowski 
et al., 2020), we expected ADM to score highly on output legitimacy. However, respondents expressed a more 
favorable view of HDM and hybrid decision-making outcomes, suggesting that they consider it illegitimate to 
leave important EU political decisions solely to automated systems. ADM systems were considered legitimate as 
long as humans remained in the loop, indicating that to maintain existing levels of perceived legitimacy, ADM 
systems should support or consult human policy-makers rather than replacing them. Furthermore, the results sug-
gest that implementing hybrid systems for EU policy-making would mean that the EU doubles down on focusing 
on output legitimacy instead of input legitimacy as citizens by no means perceive those systems to solve the 
democratic deficit of the EU, yet they consider them to produce equally good policy outcomes. As a byproduct 
ADM or hybrid systems arguably contribute to public perceptions of the EU as a technocractic political system. 
The findings also indicate that increasing factual legitimacy (e.g., by improving the quality of policy outcomes) 
does not necessarily yield a corresponding increase in perceived legitimacy.  
7.2. Implications for data-driven policy-making 
Our findings also contribute to the current discussion around data-driven or algorithmic policy-making. To begin, 
ADM systems do not seem to enhance citizens’ assessment of decision-making procedures or outcomes; indeed, 
the use of ADM systems as sole decision-makers diminishes perceived legitimacy. However, when such systems 
operate under the scrutiny of democratically elected institutions (as in the hybrid condition), they are seen to be 
as legitimate as the existing policy-making process. This suggests that including humans in the loop is a necessary 
precondition for implementing ADM (Goldenfein, 2019), and recent reports indicate that this may be the more 
plausible scenario in the immediate future (AlgorithmWatch, 2019; Poel et al., 2018). This finding has important 
implications for data-driven policy-making, as it shows that citizens view human-in-the-loop decision making as 
legitimate arguably because politicians can modify or overrule decisions made by ADM systems (Dietvorst, 
Simmons, & Massey, 2018).  
Of course, our study tests a very demanding form of algorithmic policy-making in which algorithms take important 
budgeting decisions under conditions of limited (hybrid condition) or no (ADM condition) democratic oversight. 
Yet, as Verhulst, Engin and Crowcroft point out: “Data have the potential to transform every part of the policy-
making life cycle—agenda setting and needs identification; the search for solutions; prototyping and implemen-
tation of solutions; enforcement; and evaluation” (Verhulst et al., 2019, p. 1). Public administration has only 
recently begun to exploit the potential of ADM to produce better outcomes (Wirtz, Weyerer, & Geyer, 2018). For 
instance, the Netherlands now uses an ADM system to detect welfare fraud, and in Poland, the Ministry of Justice 
has implemented an ADM system that randomly allocates court cases to judges (AlgorithmWatch, 2019). Given 
the increased data availability and computing power fueling powerful AI innovations, it is reasonable to assume 
that we have only scratched the surface of algorithmic policy-making and that more demanding forms of ADM 
will be implemented in the future. Moreover, first opinion polls suggest that significant shares of citizens (25% in 
the EU) agree with AI taking over important political decisions about their country (Rubio & Lastra, 2019). The 
present findings suggest that implementation processes should be designed to facilitate synergies between algo-
rithmic and human decision-making.  
7.3. Implications for future empirical research 
Three main limitations of this study outline avenues for future empirical research. First, our sample was not rep-
resentative of the German population. As data were collected using the non-commercial SoSci Open Access Panel 
(OAP), the convenience sample was skewed in terms of education. This may have yielded slightly more positive 
perceptions of current EU legitimacy (HDM condition) as compared to the German population, as previous evi-
dence suggests that higher levels of education are associated with more positive attitudes to the EU (Boomgaarden, 
Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011). To make stronger claims in terms of the generalizability of the results, 
future research should use representative national samples. 
Second, our study was limited to Germany. While German citizens generally hold more positive views of the EU 
compared to the European average (European Commission, 2019b), they also favor algorithmic decision-making 
in politics more than the European average (Rubio & Lastra, 2019). Future studies should investigate the relation-
ship between AI-driven decision-making and perceptions of legitimacy in other national contexts and by means 
of cross-country comparisons. For instance, preliminary opinion polls suggest that Netherlands citizens express 
much higher support for ADM in policy-making than citizens of Portugal (43% versus 19%, respectively) (Rubio 
& Lastra, 2019). 
Finally, two of the three decision-making arrangements tested here are hypothetical and are unlikely to be imple-
mented in the immediate future—that is, ADM systems are unlikely to be authorized to allocate the EU’s annual 
budget. On that basis, future research should focus on the effects of less abstract data-driven applications on 
perceived legitimacy at different stages of the policy cycle and should include varying degress of transparency of 
self-learning systems (De Fine Licht & De Fine Licht, 2020). For instance, citizens may consider it more legiti-
mate to employ AI-based systems to identify existing societal issues requiring political action or to evaluate the 
success of legislation based on extensive available data, on the condition that such systems will be able to give 
convincing justifications for their decisions.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Conclusions are given here. This study sheds light on citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of using ADM in EU 
policy-making. Based on these empirical findings, we suggest that EU policy-makers should exercise caution 
when incorporating ADM systems in the decision-making process. To maintain current levels of perceived legit-
imacy, ADM systems should only be used to assist or consult human decision-makers rather than replacing them, 
as excluding humans from the loop seems detrimental to perceived legitimacy. Second, it seems clear that the 
factual and perceived legitimacy of ADM do not necessarily correspond—that is, even ADM systems that produce 
high quality outputs and are implemented transparently and fairly may still be perceived as illegitimate and will 
therefore be rejected. To be socially acceptable, implementation of ADM systems must therefore take account of 
both factual and perceived legitimacy. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 4. 
Deviations from the Pre-Registration 
Pre-Registration Paper Reason 
Terminology: “AI Systems” Terminology: “ADM Systems” 
(Algorithmic Decision Making) 
ADM is the more precise termi-
nology (AlgorithmWatch, 2019) 
Measurement of Throughput Le-
gitimacy with six items (fair, satis-
factory, just, appropriate, reliable, 
trustworthy) 
Measurement of Throughput Le-
gitimacy with three items (fair, 
satisfactory, appropriate) 
Better fit of the measurement 
model, all latent constructs were 
measured with three items 
Full final model with control vari-
ables (Acceptance of technology, 
political interest, perceived plausi-
bility) 
Full final model with control vari-
ables (Acceptance of technology, 
political interest, perceived plausi-
bility) 
Better power of the study, better 
fit indices of the model, control 
variables were not important for 
hypothesis testing 
Note. Pre-Registration is available at OSF: 
https://osf.io/2acqu?view_only=6241cc33bb8949f3b7aa7fc2f8d4f81a 
 
 
Translation of the Treatment Conditions 
 
Condition 1 – Human Decision-Making 
The budget of the European Union 
The annual EU budget is €160 billion (2018). This is a large sum in absolute terms, but represents only 1.02% 
of the EU's annual economic output. 
The money from the EU budget is used in areas where it makes sense to pool resources for the benefit of Europe 
as a whole, for example: 
• the development of transport routes, energy networks and communication links between EU countries, 
• the protection of the environment throughout Europe, 
• increasing the global competitiveness of the European economy, 
• the promotion of transnational groupings of European researchers and scientists. 
Who decides on the use of the funds?  
The decision on the budget for each year is made in two main steps: 
1. In a first step, the European Commission prepares a draft budget and submits it to the governments of 
the member states - represented in the Council of the EU - and to the democratically elected European 
Parliament. 
2. The Commission's budget proposal is then debated, negotiated and, if necessary, adapted in the Euro-
pean Council and the European Parliament. Once the proposal has been accepted by all the institutions 
involved, the budget for the following year is ready.  
EU budget 2018 as pie chart itemized by the financial framework 
 
 
 
 
Condition 2 – Algorithmic Decision-Making  
The budget of the European Union 
The annual EU budget is €160 billion (2018). This is a large sum in absolute terms, but represents only 1.02% 
of the EU's annual economic output. 
The money from the EU budget is used in areas where it makes sense to pool resources for the benefit of Europe 
as a whole, for example: 
• the development of transport routes, energy networks and communication links between EU countries, 
• the protection of the environment throughout Europe, 
• increasing the global competitiveness of the European economy, 
• the promotion of transnational groupings of European researchers and scientists. 
Who decides on the use of the funds? 
The decision on the budget for each year is made in two main steps: 
1. As a first step, high performance computers of the European Court of Auditors bring together all data 
available at EU level. Examples are available structural and administrative data from the EU and indi-
vidual member states, economic and social forecasting models and other data from business and sci-
ence. On the basis of large data sets, an "Artificial Intelligence" calculates the optimal distribution key 
of resources for the individual areas of the EU budget within a few hours with the help of so-called ma-
chine learning applications. 
2. The resulting model is audited by the Court of Auditors and then presented to the President of the Eu-
ropean Commission and the Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget for signature. Thus 
the budget for the following year is ready. 
EU budget 2018 as pie chart itemized by the categories the financial framework 
 
 
Condition 3 – Hybrid Decision-Making 
The budget of the European Union 
The annual EU budget is €160 billion (2018). This is a large sum in absolute terms, but represents only 1.02% 
of the EU's annual economic output. 
The money from the EU budget is used in areas where it makes sense to pool resources for the benefit of Europe 
as a whole, for example: 
• the development of transport routes, energy networks and communication links between EU countries, 
• the protection of the environment throughout Europe, 
• increasing the global competitiveness of the European economy, 
• the promotion of transnational groupings of European researchers and scientists. 
Who decides on the use of the funds?  
The decision on the budget for each year is made in two main steps: 
1. In a first step, high performance computers of the European Court of Auditors bring together all data 
available at EU level. Examples are available structural and administrative data from the EU and indi-
vidual Member States, economic and social forecasting models and other data from business and sci-
ence. On the basis of large data sets, an "artificial intelligence" calculates the optimal distribution key 
of resources for the individual areas of the EU budget within a few hours with the help of so-called ma-
chine learning applications. 
2. The budget proposal is then debated, negotiated and, if necessary, adapted in the European Commis-
sion, the European Council and the European Parliament. Once the proposal has been accepted by all 
the institutions involved, the budget for the following year is ready. 
EU budget 2018 as pie chart itemized by the financial framework. 
